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245	1		_aStrategic information transmission in peer-to-peer lending markets / _cFabio Caldieraro, Jonathan Z. Zhang, Marcus Cunha Jr., & Jeffrey D. Shulman.
240	1		_aJournal of Marketing
100			_a82
100			_d2
700			_a3/1/2018
700	0		_a42-63
110			_aArticle
260			_aEnglish : _b,
250			_aasymmetric information ; consumer-to-consumer interactions ; consumer financial decision making ; electronic commerce ; P2P platforms
300			_aPeer-to-peer (P2P) marketplaces, such as Uber, Airbnb, and Lending Club, have experienced massive growth in recent years. They now constitute a significant portion of the world`s economy and provide opporunities for people to transact directly with one another. However, such growth also challenges participants to cope with information asymmetry about the quality of the offerings in the marketplace. By conducting an analysis of a P2P lending market, the authors propse and test a theory in which countersignaling provides a mechanism to attenuate information asymmetry about financial products (loans) offered on the platform. Data from a P2P lending website reveal significant, nonmonotonic relationships among the transmission of nonverifiable information, loan funding, and expost loan quality, consistent with the proposed theory. The results provide insights for platform owners who seek to manage the level of information asymmetry in their P2P environments to create more balanced marketplaces, as well as for P2P participants interested in improving their ability to process information about the goods and services they seek to transact online.
942			_2lcc _cpr _ajpascua _b2020-11-10 11:45:43 _djpascua _e2020-11-10 11:45:43
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998			_a11613
999			_c11511 _d11511